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Individual-level health data are often not publicly available due to
confidentiality; masked data are released instead. Therefore, it is im-
portant to evaluate the utility of using the masked data in statistical
analyses such as regression. In this paper we propose a data masking
method which is based on spatial smoothing techniques. The pro-
posed method allows for selecting both the form and the degree of
masking, thus resulting in a large degree of flexibility. We investi-
gate the utility of the masked data sets in terms of the mean square
error (MSE) of regression parameter estimates when fitting a Gener-
alized Linear Model (GLM) to the masked data. We also show that
incorporating prior knowledge on the spatial pattern of the exposure
into the data masking may reduce the bias and MSE of the parameter
estimates. By evaluating both utility and disclosure risk as functions
of the form and the degree of masking, our method produces a risk-
utility profile which can facilitate the selection of masking parame-
ters. We apply the method to a study of racial disparities in mortality
rates using data on more than 4 million Medicare enrollees residing
in 2095 zip codes in the Northeast region of the United States.
1. Introduction. Individual-level information such as health data col-
lected by, for example, government agencies, are often not publicly available
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in order to preserve confidentiality. On the other hand, there is public de-
mand on these individual-level data for research purposes. As an example,
associations of individual health with various risk factors are of great interest
and concern nowadays. Statistical research that addresses these two compet-
ing needs is known as statistical disclosure limitation, where a large number
of methods are developed on how to process and release information that
is subject to confidentiality concern [Duncan and Lambert (1986); Fienberg
and Willenborg (1998); Willenborg and Waal (1996, 2001)]. In this paper we
refer to those methods that alter the original data values as “data masking.”
Corresponding to the two competing needs, a data masking method should
be evaluated from both the utility of the masked data which represents the
information retained after the masking, and the disclosure risk of the masked
data which is the risk that a data intruder can obtain confidential informa-
tion (e.g., obtain original data values and/or identify an individual to whom
a data record belongs). Ideally, masked data would have low disclosure risk
while preserving data utility as much as possible.
Examples of commonly used data masking methods include aggregated
tabular counts for categorical data [Fienberg and Slavkovic (2004)], data
swapping which exchanges values between selected records, with its various
extensions [Dalenius and Reiss (1982); Fienberg and McIntyre (2005)], cell
suppression where certain cells of contingency tables are not displayed [Cox
(1995)], simulating synthetic data which have the same (conditional) dis-
tribution as the original data [Rubin (1993); Fienberg, Makov and Steele
(1998); Raghunathan, Reiter and Rubin (2003); Reiter (2003, 2005b)], and
additive random noise for continuous variables [Kim (1986); Sullivan and
Fuller (1989); Fuller (1993); Trottini et al. (2004)], etc.
Among these methods, data aggregation, data swapping, additive ran-
dom noise and many other methods can be formulated as matrix mask-
ing [Duncan and Pearson (1991)]. Suppose data on n observations and p
variables are stored in a n × p matrix. Matrix masking takes the general
form of Z∗ = AZB +C, where Z is the original data matrix and Z∗ is the
masked data matrix. Matrices A, B and C are row (observation) operator,
column (variable) operator and random noise, respectively. Links between
the above masking methods to matrix masking are investigated in Duncan
and Pearson (1991), Cox (1994), Fienberg (1994) and Fienberg, Makov and
Steele (1998).
Measuring and evaluating utility of masked data is important. In general
there are two classes of utility measures. One is global utility measures which
reflect the general distribution of masked data compared to that of the
original data and are not specific to any analysis. Such measures include
the number of swaps in data swapping, the added variance in the additive
random noise approach, differences between continuous original and masked
data in their first and second moments, etc. More sophisticated measures
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that compare distributions of masked and original data can be found in
Dobra et al. (2002), Gomatam, Karr and Sanil (2005) and Woo et al. (2009).
In addition, Bayesian decision theory-based utility is discussed in Trottini
and Fienberg (2002) and Dobra, Fienberg and Trottini (2003).
The second class of utility measures is analysis-specific tailored to an-
alysts’ inference. For the utility associated with regression inference, Karr
et al. (2006) examine the overlap in the confidence intervals of linear regres-
sion coefficients estimated with original and masked data. Kim (1986) and
Fuller (1993) show for the additive random noise approach that if masked
data preserve the first two moments of original data, then coefficient es-
timates from linear regression using masked data are (approximately) un-
biased. In addition, the methods of aggregated tabular counts and data
swapping can produce valid results for loglinear models because they pre-
serve the marginal total of contingency tables. This is equivalent to preserv-
ing sufficient statistics for loglinear models, given that the margins of all
higher-order interactions that appear in the model are preserved [Fienberg
and Slavkovic (2004); Fienberg and McIntyre (2005)]. Recently, Slavkovic
and Lee (2010) investigated logistic regression inference for contingency ta-
bles that preserve marginal total or conditional probabilities. However, for a
general data structure additional research is needed. For example, bias and
variance of parameter estimates from nonlinear regression using masked data
are not quantified as functions of masking parameters.
We propose a special case of matrix masking where we construct row
(observation) transformed data, that is, Z∗ =AZ, using spatial smoothing.
We investigate the mean square error (MSE) of the regression parameter
estimates when fitting a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) to the masked
data, and we provide guidance on how to select the masking parameters to
reduce the MSE. Specifically, for both regressors and outcome we construct
masked data which are weighted averages of the original individual-level
data by using linear smoothers. The shape of the smoothing weight func-
tion defines the “form” of masking and the smoothness parameter measures
the “degree” of masking. By choosing an appropriate weight function and
smoothness parameter value, the masked data can account for prior knowl-
edge on the spatial pattern of individual-level data, and parameter estimates
from nonlinear regression using such masked data may be less subject to bias
and MSE. Although data utility is our main focus, we also evaluate iden-
tification disclosure risk. We consider the scenario wherein a data intruder
has correct information on the risk factor regressors (e.g., exposure or de-
mographic data) from some external data sources, and his/her objective is
to obtain the confidential information on the health outcome through record
matching. Using our method, we can evaluate both the utility and the disclo-
sure risk as functions of the form and the degree of masking, which produces
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a risk-utility profile and can facilitate the selection of the masking parame-
ters. We also derive a closed-form expression for calculating the first-order
bias of the regression parameter estimates when estimated using the masked
data, for any assumed distribution of the outcome given the regressors in
the exponential family.
We apply our method to a study of racial disparities in risks of mortality
for a large sample of the U.S. Medicare population. This study consists
of more than 4 million individuals in the Northeast region of the United
States. We develop and apply statistical models to estimate the age and
gender adjusted association between race and risks of mortality when using
both the original individual-level data and the masked data. The estimated
association obtained from using the original individual-level data is the gold-
standard, and we compare it to the estimated association obtained from
using the masked data. We also calculate the identification disclosure risk
of the masked data sets.
In Section 2 we detail the method, and in Section 3 we present the simula-
tion studies. In Section 4 we apply our method to the Medicare data set, and
in Section 5 we discuss the method and the results. The R code is provided
in the Supplement [Zhou, Dominici and Louis (2010b)], while the Medicare
data set is not provided due to a confidentiality agreement. Derivation of
the closed-form expression for the first-order bias of the GLM regression
parameter estimates when estimated using the masked data is presented in
the Appendix.
2. Methods.
2.1. Matrix masking using spatial smoothing. Assume that the outcome
variable Y and the regressors X are spatial processes {Y (s),X(s)}, and
the observed individual-level data {(Yi,Xi), i= 1, . . . ,N} are realizations of
the spatial processes at locations s= {s1, . . . , sN}, that is, Xi =X(si),Yi =
Y (si), i= 1, . . . ,N . We construct masked data at s using spatial smoothing,
and we show later that this masking approach is a special case of matrix
masking by row (observation) transformation.
Let Wλ(u, s;S) denote the relative weight assigned to data at location s
when generating smoothed data for the target location u, where λ≥ 0 is a
smoothness parameter, and S denotes all spatial locations in a study area
so s is a subset of S. The parameter λ controls the degree of smoothness,
with smoothness increasing with λ. For notational convenience we suppress
the dependence of W on S.
We consider a subclass of linear smoothers under which the smoothed
spatial processes at location u are defined as follows. For λ > 0,
Yλ(u) =
∫
Y (s)Wλ(u, s)dN(s)
/∫
Wλ(u, s)dN(s),
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(2.1)
Xλ(u) =
∫
X(s)Wλ(u, s)dN(s)
/∫
Wλ(u, s)dN(s),
where N(s) is the counting process for locations with available data from the
spatial processes {Y (s),X(s)}. For ∀u∈ s we require thatW0(u, s) = I{s=u}.
If W is continuous in λ, we define W0(u, s) as limλ↓0Wλ(u, s). Therefore, we
have that {Y0(si),X0(si)}= {Yi,Xi}, the original individual-level data.
We generate masked data by taking the predictions from (2.1) at s where
the original individual-level data are available, that is, {Yλ(si),Xλ(si), i =
1, . . . ,N}. By definition in (2.1), the masked data are weighted averages of
the original individual-level data {Y (si),X(si)}. The shape of the weight
function W and the degree of smoothness λ control the form and the de-
gree of masking, respectively, where the degree of masking increases with
the degree of smoothness. In practice, the masked data at location si are
computed by
Yλ(si) =
N∑
k=1
YkWλ(si, sk)
/ N∑
k=1
Wλ(si, sk),
(2.2)
Xλ(si) =
N∑
k=1
XkWλ(si, sk)
/ N∑
k=1
Wλ(si, sk),
where the same W and λ are applied to both Y and X. Examples of com-
monly used smoothers within this class include parametric linear regressions
fitted by ordinary least square and weighted least square, penalized lin-
ear splines with truncated polynomial basis, kernel smoothers and LOESS
smoothers [Simonoff (1996); Bowman and Azzalini (1997); Hastie, Tibshi-
rani and Friedman (2001); Ruppert, Wand and Carroll (2003)].
Let Y and Yλ denote the vectors of {Yi} and {Yλ(si)}, and let X and
Xλ denote the matrices of {Xi} and {Xλ(si)}, respectively, where Xi and
Xλ(si), i = 1, . . . ,N , are row vectors. It can be seen that Yλ = AλY and
Xλ = AλX , where Aλ = (Aλij ) = (Wλ(si, sj)/
∑N
j=1Wλ(si, sj)). Therefore,
constructing masked data by equation (2.2) is a special case of matrix mask-
ing by row (observation) transformation. Reidentification from (Yλ,Xλ) to
(Y,X ) requires knowledge of both W and λ as well as the existence of A−1λ .
2.2. Bias and variance in nonlinear regression using masked data. Bias
may arise when a nonlinear model that is specified for the original individual-
level data is fitted to the masked data. Specifically, we assume the following
model for the original individual-level data which is viewed as the “truth,”
g(E{Y|X}) =Xβ.(2.3)
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Model (2.3) implies the analogous model for the masked data
g(E{Yλ|Xλ}) =Xλβ(2.4)
only for a linear function g(x) = ax, where a is a constant (except for few
special circumstances such as Xi = x, i.e., constant exposure). Specifically,
g(E{Yλ|Xλ}) = aE{Yλ|Xλ}= aE{Yλ|X}
= aAλE{Y|X}
model (3)
= aAλa
−1Xβ =Xλβ.
It follows that for a nonlinear regression model (2.3), the coefficient estimate
obtained by fitting model (2.4) will be a biased estimate of β. Therefore, it is
important to evaluate the bias of the coefficient estimate under model (2.4)
as well as how the bias varies as a function of the form and the degree of data
masking. To consider both the bias and variance of the coefficient estimate
obtained by fitting model (2.4), we evaluate the MSE as a function of the
form and the degree of masking.
It is common to assume that the masked data are mutually indepen-
dent. However, they are generally correlated, since they combine information
across the same original data. To investigate the impact of this correlation
on the uncertainty of the coefficient estimate when using the masked data,
we compare the “naive” confidence interval under model (2.4) which does
not account for this correlation with an appropriate confidence interval ob-
tained by using simulation or bootstrap methods [Efron (1979); Efron and
Tibshirani (1993)].
2.3. Identification disclosure risk of masked data. We evaluate the iden-
tification disclosure risk of the masked data by calculating the probability
of identification as developed in Reiter (2005a). To compute the risk of the
released masked data set, we first compute the probability of matching for
a particular data record.
Specifically, let Z= (Y,X ) denote the unmasked data set and Zλ = (Yλ,Xλ)
denote the released masked data set. Let t denote a data vector possessed by
a data intruder, where t contains the true values for a particular individual.
Zλ can be divided into two components: Z
U
λ which consists of variables that
are not available in t, and ZApλ which consists of variables that are available
in t. Z= (ZU ,ZAp) is the same decomposition of the true data set. Let J
be a random variable that equals j if to match t with the jth individual in
Zλ. The probability of matching is Pr(J = j|t,Zλ), j = 1, . . . ,N , assuming
that t always corresponds to an individual within Zλ. Assumptions about
the knowledge and behavior of the intruder are used to determine this prob-
ability. Using Bayes’ rule,
Pr(J = j|t,Zλ) =
Pr(Zλ|J = j, t)Pr(J = j|t)∑N
j=1Pr(Zλ|J = j, t)Pr(J = j|t)
,
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where Pr(Zλ|J = j, t) can be decomposed into
Pr(zλ,1, . . . ,zλ,j−1,zλ,j+1, . . . ,zλ,N |zλ,j , J = j, t)
·Pr(zUλ,j |z
Ap
λ,j , J = j, t) ·Pr(z
Ap
λ,j |J = j, t).
Following the guidance in Reiter (2005a), we compute each component of
Pr(J = j|t,Zλ) as follows:
1. Pr(J = j|t) = 1/N . This is because the true values are replaced by some
weighted averages upon releasing, so exact matching between t and any
Z
Ap
λ record is not possible.
2. Pr(zApλ,j |J = j, t) equals
1−
‖zApλ,j − t‖
maxNk=1 ‖z
Ap
λ,k − t‖
,(2.5)
which is the tail probability of a uniform distribution with density 1/
maxNk=1 ‖z
Ap
λ,k − t‖. We assume the intruder knows that the masked data
are weighted averages of the original data. As we point out at the end
of Section 2.1, detailed information on W and λ shall not be released.
Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that the intruder will assume
a uniform distribution based on the difference from t. The larger the
difference, the smaller the probability.
3. Pr(zUλ,j |z
Ap
λ,j , J = j, t) is computed through∫
Pr(zUλ,j |z
U
j ,z
Ap
λ,j , J = j, t)Pr(z
U
j |z
Ap
λ,j , J = j, t)dz
U
j ,(2.6)
where Pr(zUλ,j |z
U
j ,z
Ap
λ,j , J = j, t) = 1−
‖zU
λ,j
−zUj ‖
maxN
k=1 ‖z
U
λ,k
−zUj ‖
, Pr(zUj |z
Ap
λ,j , J = j, t)
is obtained through regression of ZU on ZApλ , and the integral is computed
using Monte Carlo integration.
4. Pr(zλ,1, . . . ,zλ,j−1,zλ,j+1, . . . ,zλ,N |zλ,j , J = j, t) is conservatively assumed
to be equal to 1. As pointed out in Reiter (2005a), such assumption pro-
vides the upper limit on the identification risks and greatly simplifies the
calculation.
Assuming a record t is matched to the individuals with the largest proba-
bility of matching, we measure the identification disclosure risk of the entire
released data set using the expected percentage of correct matches. Same as
in Reiter (2005a), we assume that the intruder possesses correct records for
all individuals in the released data set and seeks to match each record with
an individual with replacement, that is, matching of one record is indepen-
dent from matching of another record. Let mj be the number of individual
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records with the maximum matching probability for tj, j = 1, . . . ,N . Let
Ij = 1 if the mj individual records contain the correct match, and Ij = 0
otherwise. The expected percentage of correct matches is
∑N
j=1
1
mj
Ij/N .
3. Simulation studies.
3.1. Data generation, parameter estimation and disclosure risk evalua-
tion. In this section we conduct simulation studies to illustrate that pa-
rameter estimates from regression using masked data may be less subject to
bias and MSE when the selection of the smoothing weight function accounts
for the spatial patterns of exposure. We illustrate this point using three ex-
amples. In each case, we define the study area to be [−1,1]× [−1,1]. Within
this study area we randomly select 1000 locations as s where individual-level
exposure and outcome data are obtained.
In each example, we define a spatial process of exposure X(s) and we
obtain X(si) for si ∈ s. We simulate the individual-level outcome data at s
from a model of the general form
Y (si)
i.i.d.
∼ Poisson(eµ+βX(si)),(3.1)
with the individual-level exposure coefficient β being the parameter of in-
terest. The values of µ and β are selected to achieve reasonable variability
of E{Y (si)|X(si)} under model (3.1) across the locations.
We construct the masked data {Yλ(si),Xλ(si)} using kernel smoothers,
and we estimate the exposure coefficient βλ under model
Yλ(si)
i.i.d.
∼ Poisson(eµλ+βλXλ(si)),(3.2)
which is analogous to model (3.1) but fitted to the masked data. The masked
data are constructed and βλ is estimated for each combination of 20 λ values
and two different kernel weights, respectively, so we can evaluate the bias
and the MSE as functions of both the smoothing weight and λ.
In addition, we construct spatially aggregated data by equally partitioning
the study area into 7× 7 = 49 cells and calculating Y+j =
∑nj
i=1 Y (si) and
X¯·j =
∑nj
i=1X(si)/nj , where nj is the total number of individual-level data
points in cell j, j = 1, . . . ,49. We estimate the exposure coefficient βe using
the aggregated data {Y+j, X¯·j} under the analogous model
Y+j
i.i.d.
∼ nj ·Poisson(e
µe+βeX¯·j).(3.3)
To evaluate the identification disclosure risk, we consider the scenario
that a data intruder possesses the correct exposure data, that is, X(si) for
si ∈ s, and seeks the matches with the released data set in order to obtain
information on the health outcome Y . Specifically, ZAp is X and ZU is Y .
We generate 500 replicates of the individual-level outcome data. For each
replicate βλ and βe are estimated as above, and the estimates are averaged
across the 500 replicates.
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3.2. Choice of smoothing weight function. To select a weight function
that may lead to less bias and possibly smaller MSE when estimating the
exposure coefficient using the masked data, we notice that expectation of
the masked outcome Yλ(si) with respect to model (3.2) is
E{Yλ(si)|Xλ(si)}= e
µλ+βλXλ(si),
while expectation of Yλ(si) with respect to model (3.1) is
E{Yλ(si)|X}=
∫
eµ+βX(s)Wλ(si, s)dN(s)
= eµ+βXλ(si)
∫
eβ[X(s)−Xλ(si)]Wλ(si, s)dN(s),
where X = {X(s)}. The comparison between E{Yλ(si)|X} and
E{Yλ(si)|Xλ(si)} suggests that we can reduce the bias and possibly the
MSE of estimating µ and β when using the masked data by selecting a W
s.t.
∫
eβ[X(s)−Xλ(si)]Wλ(si, s)dN(s) is close to 1. One way to construct such
a W is to assign high weights to locations that receive similar exposure as
the target location and low weights otherwise. The W constructed in this
way has the property that it accounts for prior knowledge on the spatial
pattern of the exposure. In our examples, this is also the spatial pattern of
the outcome due to the model assumption (3.1). Therefore, to assess the
difference in bias and MSE when varying the smoothing weight function, we
construct two different kernel weights for data masking in the way that one
weight accounts for prior knowledge on the spatial pattern of the exposure
as above, while the other does not.
3.3. Example I. We assume that the exposure is eradiated from a point
source A and decreases symmetrically in all directions as the Euclidean
distance from A increases. Specifically, we define X1(s) = 7exp(−r
2
s/2.5)
for s ∈ [−1,1] × [−1,1], where rs is the Euclidean distance between lo-
cation s and the point source A. Figure 1(a) shows the contour plot of
X1(s). The individual-level outcome is simulated from Y1(si)
i.i.d.
∼
Poisson(e−25+4X1(si)). Aggregated data of exposure and outcome are con-
structed by calculating group summaries of {Y1(si),X1(si)} as described in
Section 3.1.
We construct masked data {Y1λ(si),X1λ(si)} by using equation (2.2) with
both the Euclidean kernel weight W ∗λ and the ring kernel weight W1λ which
are defined as follows:
W ∗λ (u, s) = exp(−‖s− u‖
2/λ),(3.4)
W1λ(u, s) = exp(−|r
2
s − r
2
u|/λ).(3.5)
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The ring kernel weight W1λ(u, s) decreases exponentially as the difference
between r2s and r
2
u increases, and such difference is positively associated with
the difference between X1(s) and X1(u) according to the spatial pattern of
the exposure. Figure 1(b) shows the contour plot of W1λ(s1, ·). On the other
hand, the Euclidean kernel weight W ∗λ (u, s) solely depends on ‖s− u‖, the
Euclidean distance between location u and location s, and therefore does
not account for prior knowledge on the spatial distribution of the exposure.
Fig. 1. Example I of spatially varying exposure, weight function for spatial smooth-
ing, estimates, and disclosure risk. (a) Contour plot of exposure from point source
A: X1(s) = 7exp(−r
2
s/2.5), with cells for spatial aggregation. (b) Contour plot of ring
weight function W1λ(s1, s) = exp(−|r
2
s − r
2
s1
|/λ) for calculating spatially smoothed ex-
posure and outcome data at location s1, from individual-level exposure X1(s) in (a)
and individual-level outcome Y1(s) simulated by Y1(s) ∼ Poisson(exp(−25 + 4X1(s)))
where β = 4, with λ = 0.5. (c) Estimates of βλ with “naive” 95% confidence intervals
by fitting model Y1λ(s) ∼ Poisson(exp(µλ + βλX1λ(s))) where {Y1λ(s),X1λ(s)} are con-
structed using the ring weight function in (b) and using the Euclidean weight function
W ∗λ (s1, s) = exp(−‖s − s1‖
2/λ), with reference lines at β = 4 and at the estimate from
aggregated data. (d) Mean square error (MSE) of βλ using “naive” variance. (e) Identi-
fication disclosure risk measured by the expect percentage of correct record matching. (f)
Disclosure risk versus MSE for utility-risk trade-off.
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3.4. Example II. We assume that the exposure is eradiated from a point
source A and toward a certain direction. Specifically, we define X2(s) = 7×
exp(−r2s/6− cos θs/3) for s ∈ [−1,1]× [−1,1], where θs is the angle between
the direction from point source A to location s and the direction that the
exposure is toward, and rs is defined the same as in Example I. Figure 2(a)
shows the contour plot of X2(s). The individual-level outcome is simulated
from Y2(si)
i.i.d.
∼ Poisson(e−36+4X2(si)). Aggregated data of exposure and out-
come are constructed by calculating group summaries of {Y2(si),X2(si)} as
described in Section 3.1.
We construct masked data {Y2λ(si),X2λ(si)} by using equation (2.2) with
the Euclidean kernel weight (3.4) and the ring angle kernel weight
W2λ(u, s) = exp(−(|r
2
s − r
2
u|+2| cos θs − cos θu|)/λ),
which decreases exponentially as the difference between r2s and r
2
u increases
as well as the difference between cos θs and cos θu increases. Figure 2(b)
shows the contour plot of W2λ(s1, ·).
3.5. Example III. We assume that the exposure is eradiated from a point
source A but blocked in a certain area, such as blocked by a mountain, so the
blocked area receives no exposure. Specifically, we define the unblocked area
to be sx ≤ 0.4 or cosϑs ≤ 0.625 for s ∈ [−1,1]× [−1,1], where sx is the x-axis
value of location s and ϑs is the angle between the positive x-axis and the
direction from point source A to location s. We define the exposure X3(s) =
7exp(−r2s/2.5) · Is for s ∈ [−1,1]× [−1,1], where Is is the indicator that s is
located within the unblocked area, and rs is defined the same as in Examples
I and II. Figure 3(a) shows the contour plot of X3(s). The individual-level
outcome is simulated from Y3(si)
i.i.d.
∼ Poisson(e−24+4X3(si)). Aggregated data
of exposure and outcome are constructed by calculating group summaries
of {Y3(si),X3(si)} as described in Section 3.1.
We construct masked data {Y3λ(si),X3λ(si)} by using equation (2.2) with
the Euclidean kernel weight (3.4) and the ring block kernel weight
W3λ(u, s) = exp(−|r
2
s − r
2
u|/λ) · (Is = Iu),
which assigns nonzero weight only when location u and location s are both
in the blocked or unblocked area. In addition, the nonzero weight from
W3λ(u, s) decreases exponentially as the difference between r
2
s and r
2
u in-
creases. Figure 3(b) shows the contour plot of W3λ(s1, ·).
3.6. Results. Results of Example I on parameter estimates, MSE and
identification risk averaged across the 500 simulation replicates are shown in
Figure 1(c)–(e), respectively. Specifically, Figure 1(c) shows the estimated
βλ as a function of λ for the ring kernel weight (3.5) and the Euclidean
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Fig. 2. Example II of spatially varying exposure, weight function for spatial
smoothing, estimates, and disclosure risk. (a) Contour plot of exposure from
point source A toward a certain direction: X2(s) = 7exp(−r
2
s/6 − cosθs/3), with
cells for spatial aggregation. (b) Contour plot of ring angle weight function
W2λ(s1, s) = exp(−(|r
2
s − r
2
s1
| + 2| cos θs − cos θs1 |)/λ) for calculating spatially smoothed
exposure and outcome data at location s1, from individual-level exposure X2(s) in (a) and
individual-level outcome Y2(s) simulated by Y2(s) ∼ Poisson(exp(−36 + βX2(s))) where
β = 4, with λ = 0.5. (c) Estimates of βλ with “naive” 95% confidence intervals by fit-
ting model Y2λ(s)∼ Poisson(exp(µλ + βλX2λ(s))) where {Y2λ(s),X2λ(s)} are constructed
using the ring angle weight function in (b) and using the Euclidean weight function
W ∗λ (s1, s) = exp(−‖s − s1‖
2/λ), with reference lines at β = 4 and at the estimate from
aggregated data. (d) Mean square error (MSE) of βλ using “naive” variance. (e) Identi-
fication disclosure risk measured by the expect percentage of correct record matching. (f)
Disclosure risk versus MSE for utility-risk trade-off.
kernel weight (3.4), with the “naive” 95% confidence intervals. By “naive”
we mean that the confidence intervals are computed by fitting model (3.2)
directly, and therefore do not account for the possible correlation between
the masked data as pointed out earlier in Section 2.2. The reference lines
are placed at the true value of β and at the estimated βe, from which the
bias of estimating the exposure coefficient by using the estimated βλ can
be evaluated. Figure 1(d) shows the MSE as a function of λ for the two
kernel weights, where in this example MSE is largely determined by the
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Fig. 3. Example III of spatially varying exposure, weight function for spatial smooth-
ing, estimates, and disclosure risk. (a) Contour plot of exposure from point source A
but blocked in certain area: X3(s) = 7exp(−r
2
s/2.5) · Is where Is is the indicator of loca-
tion s in the unblocked area, with cells for spatial aggregation. (b) Contour plot of ring
block weight function W3λ(s1, s) = exp(−|r
2
s − r
2
s1
|/λ) · (Is = Is1) for calculating spatially
smoothed exposure and outcome data at location s1, from individual-level exposure X3(s) in
(a) and individual-level outcome Y3(s) simulated by Y3(s)∼ Poisson(exp(−24 + βX3(s)))
where β = 4, with λ = 0.5. (c) Estimates of βλ with “naive” 95% confidence intervals
by fitting model Y3λ(s) ∼ Poisson(exp(µλ + βλX3λ(s))) where {Y3λ(s),X3λ(s)} are con-
structed using the ring block weight function in (b) and using the Euclidean weight func-
tion W ∗λ (s1, s) = exp(−‖s−s1‖
2/λ), with reference lines at β = 4 and at the estimate from
aggregated data. (d) Mean square error (MSE) of βλ using “naive” variance. (e) Identi-
fication disclosure risk measured by the expect percentage of correct record matching. (f)
Disclosure risk versus MSE for utility-risk trade-off.
bias. The reference lines are placed at the MSE from regression using the
original data (in which the bias part is 0) and the MSE of βe. Figure 1(e)
shows the identification disclosure risk of the masked data set measured by
the expected percentage of correct record matching, as a function of λ for
the two kernel weights. Figure 1(f) plots the disclosure risk versus MSE,
which shows the trade-off between data utility and disclosure risk.
We find that data masking using the ring kernel weight (3.5) leads to
smaller bias and MSE when estimating the exposure coefficient than mask-
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ing using the Euclidean kernel weight (3.4), for all λ values that are con-
sidered. It suggests that when using the masked data for loglinear regres-
sion, a masking procedure that preserves the spatial pattern of the original
individual-level exposure and outcome data can lead to better estimates in
terms of smaller bias and MSE than a masking procedure that does not
do so. As λ increases, the bias and MSE increase for both kernel weights,
while the differences in the bias and MSE between the two kernel weights
decrease. This increase in the bias/MSE and decrease in the bias/MSE dif-
ferences suggest that in the presence of a high degree of masking, choice
for the form of masking may be less influential on the resultant bias/MSE.
Moreover, comparing the estimated βλ and βe, we find that for small values
of λ, the bias and MSE is smaller when using the estimated βλ from the
ring kernel weight (3.5).
On the other hand, we find that the disclosure risk is lower when using the
Euclidean kernel weight (3.4) for data masking compared to using the ring
kernel weight (3.5). This is not unexpected because masked data constructed
using the ring kernel weight is more informative about the original true
values. However, with a tolerable potential disclosure risk [<0.2 which is used
as an example cutoff in Reiter (2005a)], masked data when constructed using
the ring kernel weight can lead to better MSE which cannot be achieved by
using the Euclidean kernel weight with a comparable λ. Same as the trend
for bias and MSE, the differences in the disclosure risk between the two
kernel weights become small as λ increases.
Similar results of Example II and Example III are shown in Figure 2(c)–(f)
and Figure 3(c)–(f).
Figure 4 shows the width ratios comparing the 95% “naive” confidence
intervals versus the percentile confidence intervals obtained from the empiri-
cal distribution of the estimates across the 500 simulations, for the estimates
of βλ in the three examples respectively. Width ratio when λ= 0 (the solid
dot) is calculated using the nonsmoothed data, that is, the individual-level
data. We find that in these three examples, the “naive” confidence intervals
generally overestimate the uncertainty of the βλ estimates, and the degree
of overestimation increases as λ increases. In addition, for Examples II and
III where the spatial patterns of exposure are nonisotropic, the degree of
overestimation differs for the weight functions with and without accounting
for prior knowledge on the spatial pattern of exposure.
4. Application to Medicare data. We apply our method to the study
of racial disparities in risks of mortality for a sample of the U.S. Medicare
population.
4.1. Data source. We extract a large data set at individual-level from
the Medicare government database. Specifically, it includes individual age,
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Fig. 4. Width ratios comparing the 95% “naive” confidence intervals (CI) versus the
percentile CI obtained from the empirical distributions of the estimates across the 500
simulations, for the estimates of βλ in (a) Example I, (b) Example II, and (c) Example
III of the simulation studies. Width ratio when λ= 0 (the solid dot) is calculated using the
nonsmoothed data.
race, gender and a day-specific death indicator over the period 1999–2002,
for more than 4 million black and white Medicare enrollees who are 65
years and older residing in the Northeast region of the U.S. People who are
younger than 65 at enrollment are eliminated because they are eligible for
the Medicare program due to the presence of either a certain disability or
End Stage Renal Disease and therefore do not represent the general Medicare
population.
Figure 5 shows the study area which includes 2095 zip codes in 64 counties
in the Northeast region of the U.S. We select the counties whose centroids
are located within the range that covers the Northeast coast region of the
U.S., and we exclude zip codes without available study population from the
study map. This area covers several large, urban cities including Washington
DC, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, New Haven and Boston. It has
the advantage of high population density and substantial racial diversity.
We categorize the age of individuals into 5 intervals based on age in his/her
first year of observation: [65, 70), [70, 75), [75, 80), [80, 85) and [85, +).
This categorization facilitates detection of age effects because differences
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Fig. 5. Location of the 2095 zip codes included in our study area.
in the risks of mortality for one-year increase in age are relatively small.
We “coarsen” the daily survival information into yearly survival indicators.
By doing so, we define our outcome as the probability of the occurrence of
death for an individual in one year. This definition adjusts for the differential
follow-up time.
4.2. Statistical models and data masking. Let i denote individual, j de-
note zip code, t denote year, and Dijt be the death indicator for individual
i in zip code j in year t. Similarly as in Zhou, Dominici and Louis (2010a),
we define the individual-level model as
logitPr(Dtij = 1) = β0 + β1race ij + ageijβ2
(4.1)
+ β3gender ij + (age × gender)ijβ4.
Geographic locations for each individual are needed to spatially smooth
the individual-level data. However, from the Medicare data we only have
the longitude and latitude of the zip code centroids. Therefore, we apply
a two-step masking procedure on the individual-level data, where we first
aggregate the individual-level data to zip code-level, and we then spatially
smooth the zip-code level aggregated data to construct the masked data at
the zip code-level.
Specifically, let D++j denote the total death count and nj denote the
total person-years of zip code j. We first obtain from aggregation {% black j ,
% agecat j , % malej , % (agecat ×male)j , pj =D++j/nj , j = 1, . . . , J}, which
are the marginal distributions of race, age, gender, the joint distribution of
age and gender, and the mortality rate, respectively, of each zip code.
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Due to the complex spatial pattern of the zip code-level covariates, we
use kernel smoothers with bivariate normal density kernel weights for spatial
smoothing, so the shape of the smoothing weight is flexible by varying the
correlation parameter value of the bivariate normal distribution. Let the
vector s = {s1, s2} denote the location of a zip code, where s1 and s2 are
the longitude and latitude of the zip code centroid, respectively. We use
smoothing kernel weights of the general form
Wλ(u, s) = exp(−(s1 − u1, s2− u2)
TΣ−1λ (s1 − u1, s2 − u2)/2),
where
Σλ = λ
(
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
)
,
σ21 and σ
2
2 are the variances of the longitude and latitude data of the 2095
zip codes, respectively. We consider for ρ the following three values:
1. ρ= 0, so the weight solely depends on the Euclidean distance ‖s− u‖;
2. ρ= 0.5, so higher weight is assigned to s in the northeast and southwest
directions of u;
3. ρ=−0.5, so higher weight is assigned to s in the northwest and southeast
directions of u.
Let pjλ denote the smoothed mortality rate of zip code j from which
we calculate the smoothed death count D++jλ = pjλ · nj . Let % black jλ,
% agecat jλ, % malejλ, % (agecat ×male)jλ denote the smoothed marginal
distributions of race, age, gender and the smoothed joint distribution of age
and gender, respectively, of zip code j. We specify the model for masked
data as
D++jλ ∼ Bin(nj , pjλ),
logit pjλ = β0λ + β1λ% black jλ +β2λ% agecat jλ(4.2)
+ β3λ% malejλ+ β4λ% (agecat ×male)jλ.
The zip code-level nonsmoothed aggregated data are also used to fit model
(4.2).
To evaluate the identification disclosure risk, we consider the scenario that
a data intruder possesses correct zip code-level demographic data and seeks
the matching with the masked zip code-level data set in order to obtain
information on the zip code-level mortality. Specifically, the released data
set consists of % black jλ, % agecat jλ, % malejλ and pjλ, j = 1, . . . ,2095, and
the data intruder possess the correct % black j , % agecat j and % malej .
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4.3. Choice of association measure. The common approach to report the
association between race and mortality risks is to report the race coefficients
β1 in model (4.1) and β1λ in model (4.2), whose interpretation is subjected to
the coding of the race covariate. For direct understanding of the difference
in the risk of death between the black and white populations, we define
and report the population-level odds ratio (OR) of death comparing Blacks
versus Whites, which is a function of the predicted values [Zhou, Dominici
and Louis (2010a)]. Therefore, interpretation of this association measure
does not depend on model parameterization (e.g., on covariate centering
and scaling).
Specifically, let
Ptijb = Pr(Dtij = 1|race ij = Black ,ageij, gender ij),
Ptijw = Pr(Dtij = 1|race ij =White,ageij, gender ij)
denote the predicted probabilities of death in year t for a black person and
a white person, respectively, whose other covariates values are the same as
the ith individual in the jth zip code. We define the population-level OR
from the individual-level model (4.1) as follows:
OR =
P···bQ···w
P···wQ···b
,
where
P···b =
∑
t,i,j
Ptijb, P···w =
∑
t,i,j
Ptijw,
Q···b = 1−P···b, Q···w = 1−P···w.
Similarly, we define population-level ORλ from model (4.2) using summary
probabilities
P·bλ =
∑
j njPjbλ∑
j nj
and P·wλ =
∑
j njPjwλ∑
j nj
,
where Pjbλ and Pjwλ are the predicted probabilities of death in one year
for zip codes that consist of solely black and solely white populations, re-
spectively, and whose marginal and joint distributions of age and gender
are the same as zip code j. “Naive” standard errors of logORλ are cal-
culated using the multivariate Delta Method [Casella and Berger (2002)].
In addition, bootstrap confidence intervals for logORλ are calculated using
1000 nonparametric bootstrap samples. Both “naive” and bootstrap confi-
dence intervals for ORλ are obtained by exponentiating the corresponding
confidence intervals for logORλ.
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Fig. 6. Estimates of ORλ under model (4.2) and identification disclosure risk as a func-
tion of λ for the three weight functions. Estimates of ORλ is plotted with the 95% “naive”
confidence intervals (CI), CI using bootstrap standard error (SE) estimates, and bootstrap
percentile CI. OR0 is estimated by fitting model (4.2) to the nonsmoothed zip code-level ag-
gregated data. (a) Estimates of ORλ for bivariate normal density kernel weight with ρ= 0.
(b) Estimates of ORλ for bivariate normal density kernel weight with ρ = 0.5. (c) Esti-
mates of ORλ for bivariate normal density kernel weight with ρ=−0.5. (d) Identification
disclosure risk measured by expected percentage of correct matching.
4.4. Results. Figure 6(a)–(c) shows the estimates of ORλ under model (4.2)
as a function of λ for the three kernel weights respectively, with the 95%
“naive” confidence intervals, confidence intervals using bootstrap standard
error estimates and bootstrap percentile confidence intervals. OR0 is esti-
mated by fitting model (4.2) to the nonsmoothed zip code-level aggregated
data. The reference line is placed at the estimate of OR under the individual-
level model (4.1).
For small values of λ (<0.1), the estimates of ORλ for all three kernel
weights are smaller than the estimate of OR and therefore produce negative
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bias, while for larger values of λ the bias differs substantially for different
kernel weights. For example, data masking using the kernel weight with
ρ= 0.5 leads to consistent underestimation of the odds ratio for all λ values
that are considered. When using the kernel weight with ρ = −0.5 for data
masking, the estimates of ORλ are less subject to bias than those from using
the other two kernel weights. Differences in MSE between the three kernels
can also be inferred from the plots, and we find that using the kernel weight
with ρ=−0.5 leads to much smaller MSE than using the other two kernels.
For all three kernel weights, the “naive” confidence intervals underestimate
the uncertainty of the ORλ estimates, which is in the opposite direction of
the relation between the “naive” and the appropriate confidence intervals
in the simulation studies. The two bootstrap confidence intervals are wider
than the “naive” confidence interval when λ= 0, which suggests a systematic
difference between the bootstrap confidence intervals and the “naive” con-
fidence intervals regardless of smoothing. This systematic difference occurs
because the nonsmoothed zip code-level aggregated data may not satisfy the
Binomial model assumption in (4.2).
Figure 6(d) shows the identification disclosure risk of the masked data
set as measured by the expected percentage of correct matches when using
the three kernel weights for masking, as a function of λ. The disclosure risk
for all three kernel weights are small, ranging from 0.01–0.04. The risk is
similar for the masked data sets when using the kernel weight with ρ = 0
and ρ=−0.5 for masking, and the risk when ρ= 0.5 is slightly higher.
5. Discussion. We propose a special case of matrix masking based on
spatial smoothing techniques, where the smoothing weight function controls
the form of masking, and the smoothness parameter value directly measures
the degree of masking. Therefore, data utility and disclosure risk can be
calculated as functions of both the form and the degree of masking. In fact,
the smoothing weight function W can be any weight function and is not re-
stricted by existing smoothing methods. With the variety of combinations of
weight functions and smoothness parameter values, it is feasible to construct
masked data that maintain high data utility while preserving confidentiality.
We consider a subclass of linear smoothers that produces masked data as
weighted averages of the original data. Therefore, the masked data values
are within a reasonable range. More importantly, correlation among the
variables is invariant under linear transformation, which may intrinsically
contribute to better data utility of the masked data. On the other hand,
this subclass is a large class. It includes many commonly used smoothers.
We do not expect major restriction by focusing on this subclass of linear
smoothers.
Using our method, we investigate the utility of the masked data in terms
of bias, variance and MSE of parameter estimates when using the masked
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data for loglinear and logistic regression analysis. Note that similar studies
can be applied to any GLM. In addition, we evaluate the identification dis-
closure risk of the masked data set by calculating the expected percentage of
correct record matching. In the simulation studies, we provide guidance for
constructing masked data that can lead to better regression parameter esti-
mates in terms of smaller bias and MSE for loglinear models, and we show
the trade-off between better estimates and lower disclosure risk. Specifically,
masked data can be constructed by using a smoothing weight function that
accounts for prior knowledge on the spatial pattern of individual-level expo-
sure, together with a reasonably low degree of masking. We provide guidance
for how to select such a smoothing weight function for loglinear models. In
addition, we provide candidate weight functions for three simplified but rep-
resentative spatial patterns of exposure.
As is expected, masked data that can lead to better estimates are generally
more informative about the original data values and therefore are subject
to relatively higher identification disclosure risk. However, the flexibility in
our data masking method enables constructing the masked data that can
lead to good parameter estimates, while the disclosure risk is controlled at
a low level. In the meanwhile, caution should be placed to the institute
in releasing detailed information on the data masking approach along with
masked data. It is pointed out in Section 2.1 that simultaneously releasing
the smoothing weight function W and the smoothness parameter λ in the
existence of A−1λ can lead to reidentification of original data. However, even
if only partial information is released, for example, only the information
that data are masked using smoothing and the smoothing weight function is
released while the smoothing parameter value is not released, it is possible
that a smart data intruder can still reconstruct the transformation matrix
Aλ.
We apply our data masking method to the study of racial disparities in
risks of mortality for the Medicare population, and show how the bias and
the variance of the estimated OR of death comparing blacks to whites, and
how the identification disclosure risk, vary with the form and the degree
of masking. The results suggest that in the absence of clear guidance, it is
helpful to explore a large flexible family such as the bivariate normal density
kernel to identify a weight function that can lead to both good utility and
low identification risk for the masked data.
We compare the “naive” confidence intervals with the appropriate ones
which account for the possible correlation among masked data in both the
simulation studies and the data application, where we observe opposite di-
rections in the relation between the “naive” and the appropriate confidence
intervals. It suggests no general direction for that relation. One possible rea-
son, which is also pointed out in Section 4.4, is that the unmasked data in
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the simulation study are simulated from Poisson distributions, while the un-
masked data in the data application are real data and do not strictly follow
the assumed binomial distribution. Therefore, in the data application, the
standard errors account for both the correlation among the masked data
and the discrepancy of the original data distribution from binomial.
The simulation study and data application results show that masked data
constructed using our method can well preserve confidentiality. Specifically,
the identification disclosure risk is reasonably low for all scenarios that we
consider. Note that our calculation of the disclosure risk is conservative: we
assume that an intruder possesses true values for all the regressors, and we
use probability 1 for the component Pr(zλ,1, . . . ,zλ,j−1,zλ,j+1, . . . ,zλ,N |zλ,j ,
J = j, t) in the calculation. In addition, the flexibility in the selection of
smoothing weight function W and smoothness parameter λ can also help
control disclosure risk in addition to improving data utility.
Based on our method, we additionally derive a closed-form expression
for first-order bias of the parameter estimates obtained using the masked
data, for GLM that belong to the exponential family. The first-order bias
calculation is not necessary when both individual-level exposure and health
outcome data are available so the actual bias can be computed. It may be
used by researchers who have only the individual-level exposure information
to explore the possible bias in their analysis using masked data.
Although our proposed method uses spatial smoothing and therefore ap-
plies to spatial data, it can be easily generalized to other data types because
the masking procedure is a smoothing technique that takes weighted aver-
ages of the original data. For example, the proposed method can be general-
ized to smoothing time series data by using the smoothing weight function
Wλ(µ, s), where µ and s denote time points. Also, note that an alternative
method to mask spatial data is to mask the individual spatial location [see
Armstrong, Rushton and Zimmerman (1999); Wieland et al. (1998)].
APPENDIX: FIRST-ORDER BIAS
We derive a closed-form expression for the first-order bias of estimating
the regression coefficients in a GLM that belongs to the exponential family,
when using data masked by our method. Let β denote the vector of regres-
sion coefficients of a model specified for the original individual-level data.
When the model belongs to the exponential family, its log likelihood can be
expressed as
LL(β) =
N∑
i=1
YiXiβ− b(Xiβ)
a(φ)
+C(Yi, φ),
b′(Xiβ) = g
−1(Xiβ), where b
′(·) is the derivative of function b(·), and g(·)
is the link function. Substituting the individual-level data {Yi,Xi} by the
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masked data {Yλ(si),Xλ(si)}, we obtain log likelihood of the analogous
model when fitted to the masked data,
LLm(βλ;λ) =
N∑
i=1
Yλ(si)Xλ(si)βλ − b(Xλ(si)βλ)
aλ(φλ)
+Cλ(Yλ(si), φλ),(A.1)
where βλ denotes the corresponding vector of regression coefficients. In order
to calculate the MLE of βλ, it is common procedure to calculate the score
function from the likelihood (A.1) and take its expectation with respect
to the “true” individual-level model E{Yi|Xi}. Denote the expected score
function as S(λ,βλ) and denote β(λ) as the solution s.t. S(λ,β(λ)) = 0. It
can be shown that β(0) = β. Taking the derivative of S(λ,β(λ)) = 0 with
respect to λ and evaluating it at λ= 0, we obtain the standard result:
β′(0) =−(S2(0,β(0))
−1 · S1(0,β(0)),(A.2)
where S1 and S2 are the partial derivatives with respect to the first and
second components of ∂S/∂λ, respectively. Specifically,
S1(0,β(0)) =
N∑
i=1
XTi
(∫
h(X(s)β)R0(si, s)dN(s)
− h′(Xiβ)
∫
X(s)TR0(si, s)dN(s) ·β
)
(A.3)
S2(0,β(0)) =−
N∑
i=1
h′(Xiβ) ·X
T
i Xi,
where R0(si, s) =
∂(Wλ(si,s)/
∫
Wλ(si,s)dN(s))
∂λ |λ=0 and h(·) = g
−1(·), inverse of
the link function of the GLM. In practice, S1(0,β(0)) in (A.3) is calculated
by substituting the the integrals by summations over all locations where the
original individual-level data are available.
The quantity β′(0) denotes the instant bias of estimating β using masked
data, when changing from no masking to a very low degree of masking. As
expected, when (i) X(s) is constant across all locations in s, or (ii) g(·) is a
linear function, S1(0,β(0)) is calculated to be 0, and therefore β
′(0) = 0.
Using β′(0), we can approximate the bias of estimating β when fitting a
GLM using masked data whose degree of masking is λ, by calculating
β(λ)− β ≈ β′(0) · λ.
This bias calculation can be extended to any function of β, for example, the
predicted value. Specifically, bias in estimating f(β) can be approximated
by
f(β(λ))− f(β)≈ f ′(β) · (β(λ)− β)≈ f ′(β) ·β′(0) · λ.
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It can be seen that the first-order bias approximation can be easily gen-
eralized to approximation using higher-order terms of the Taylor series ex-
pansion in addition to the first-order term. Specifically,
β(λ)−β ≈ β′(0) · λ+β′′(0) · λ2/2 + · · ·
(A.4)
+ β(n)(0) · λn/n!, n≥ 1.
Similarly, we can generalize the bias approximation of estimating f(β).
A limitation of the bias approximation using Taylor series expansion (A.4)
is that we ignore the remainder term β(n+1)(ξ) · λ
n+1
(n+1)! , ξ ∈ (0, λ), which may
not be small for large values of λ. Therefore, the approximation only captures
the bias for λ≈ 0, that is, the instant direction and magnitude of the bias
when changing from no masking to a very low degree of masking. It may not
capture the total bias for a specified degree of masking. In the application
of our method to the Medicare data, the first-order bias is calculated to
be 0 for all three kernel weights because R0 in (A.3) equals 0. In addition,
when applying the bias approximation (A.4) to the three examples in the
simulation studies for n = 1, . . . ,5, the bias approximation is calculated to
be 0, while nonzero bias is shown by comparing the parameter estimates
when using the masked data with the true parameter value.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement: R code (DOI: 10.1214/09-AOAS325SUPP). We provide the
R code for (1) the simulation study utility part of the three examples, (2)
the function to compute the disclosure risk, and (3) the calculation of the
bivariate normal density kernel weight matrix.
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